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Investigation of size wage premium in earning’s literature neglects the important role 
played by technology adoption.  This study models the size selection corrected 
earning’s function by introducing an extra dimension of selection of technology 
complexity, using a sample from workers in US hog farms.  The estimated wage gap 
between large and small farms is reduced once correction in selection is controlled.  
Workers compensate monetary income for better work environment, better health and 
more job security, in which large farms and technologically advanced farms have 
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I.  Introduction 
It is commonly observed that larger firms pay higher wages than smaller firms.  
This size-wage premium was first documented by Henry Moore (1911), and 
corroborated by others, among them, Brown and Medoff (1989) and Oi and 
Idson(1999).  At the same time, Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) found that 
individual heterogeneity explains a large proportion of the wage variation between 
different firm size categories.  There is a mixed result on the positive size-wage 
premium after endogenous employee selection on firm size is controlled (for example, 
Idson and Feaster, 1990; Main and Reilly, 1993).  Economists try to unveil the puzzle, 
but usually they ignore another important aspect associated with firm size and wages: 
larger firms are more likely to adopt more technologies and there are 
complementarities between technology adoption and human capital, which though has 
been largely documented (Stoneman and Kwon, 1994; Colombo and Mosconi, 1995; 
Idson and Oi, 1999; Troske, 1999; Huffman, 2001).  For example, in agricultural 
settings, more educated farmers tend to be the first to attempt new tillage practices, 
plant new varieties, adopt site-specific technologies or implement new technological 
advances.  
In addition to self-sorting of workers into different sizes of firms, workers 
with different observed characteristics and unobserved preference or abilities can be 
self-selected into different firms with different technological characteristics as well.  
In addition to complementarity between technologies and their observed human 
capital, workers may opt to technologically advanced firms due to other unobserved 
attributes.  For instance, workers may want to obtain specific training pertaining to 
higher level of technologies and expect an increased return to the accumulated human 
capital in the long run.  Alternatively, firms adopting certain technologies that value 
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worker’s cooperation would like to hire workers with less aggressive characteristics. 
Apparently, these econometrically unobservables may not be orthogonal to their 
earnings.  It is not surprising that workers and employers have heterogeneous 
preference and attitudes toward types of firms that differ in wage structure, fringe 
benefits, company culture, working environment and long-run goals.  Match of 
workers and employees will reflect both labor supply and labor demand decisions, 
characterizing the equilibrium in the labor market.  When there is such a nonrandom 
assignment of workers across firms, endogeneities in earning’s function from size and 
technology adoption intensity will bias estimation of size treatment effect, technology 
adoption effect on wages and other coefficients in earning’s function.   
In this study, we put both size and technology adoption in a double selection 
framework and decompose wages components across firm types, using a sample from 
workers in US hog farms.  Earning’s function in the US hog farms using the same 
data set has been examined by Hurley, et al (1999) and Yu et al (2008).  Yu and 
Orazem (2008) further find positive relationship between hog farm size, production 
complexity and wage, simultaneously controlling for both observed and unobserved 
employer-employee characteristics.  However, these studies either do not take into 
account potential selection bias on estimation of wage equations or are muted on the 
wage differentials for different types of farms.  
This paper aims at improving understanding of size wage premium and 
earning’s function in literature.  We find that after control for individual’s selectivity 
on both firm size and firm technology complexity, size wage premium and technology 
adoption premium still exist.  However, the premiums are not as high as without 
controlling selection.  Reduced wage premium due to selection on firm size and 
technologies can be justified from perspectives of both labor supply and labor demand.    
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At the same time, these findings shed light on the importance of labor supply 
and wage policies in the agriculture industry.  Risk of occupational death is 
particularly important issue in the agriculture industry, which is the second to mining.  
According to the report in 2008 in Labor Bureau of Statistics, fatality rate in 
agricultural industry is 672 out of 100 thousands
1.  In particular, hog farmers are 
found markedly tend to have higher risk in reduced hand strength and respiratory 
symptoms than non farmers (Hurley, et al, 2000). 
In addition to monetary returns, individuals also opt to better fringe benefits, 
working environment and health security which are heterogeneous across different 
firms.  In this study, we also provide some complementary evidence on work 
environment and health of employees on the US hog farms, which can explain the 
shrunk wage gap between different types of farms.  To the extent workers on a small 
hog farm which usually do not adopt many advanced technologies are believed to face 
greater health risks, they require a compensating differential in the form of higher 
salaries in exchange for accepting the relative more risks.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents 
the double-selection corrected earning’s function.  The third section described the 
database.  The fourth section reports the empirical findings from applying the double-
selection techniques and offers some explanations.  Wage differentials between 
different types of farms are decomposed such that we can specifically know how 
much of wage gap can be attributed to worker characteristics, coefficient responses 
and selectivity.  Finally, the last section concludes the paper and discusses the 
potential improvement from further research.  




As discussed above, neglecting of selections faced by workers will bias wage 
equation estimation.  There are two choices that a worker makes need to be explicitly 
considered, the decision to work at a small or large firm and the decision to work at a 
firm with a large number of adopted technologies or with barely any advance 
technologies.  Following the modeling strategy suggested by Tunali (1986), we use a 
bivariate selection to analyze a typical worker’s choices.  
We assume the decision will be made according the following unobservable 
utility indices.  
(1)      
   
                
   
               
,  
where the     
 s represent the latent utility variables that a worker i could get when he 
make decision (j=1, 2).  j=1 means the decision to work in small/large firms and j=2 
means the decision to work in high technology/low technology firms.  The    s are 
vectors of exogenous variables which affect these utilities.     s are associated 
unknown coefficients.      and     are random errors and are assumed to jointly have 
bivariate normal distribution with their correlation coefficient   ,        ,         . If 
  is significantly di erent from zero,     and     are not independent.   ff
Although     
 ′  are not directly observed, two dummy variables can be 
defined as follows: 
(2)        nd     0 therwise;        1  if      0  a     o
(3)         1   if    
   0  and      0  otherwise. 
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Based on the observed value of D1 and D2, workers can be put into four different 
groups   ,   1,2,3,4 .    includes firms that are small and use small number of 
technologies.     includes small firms which uses a large number of technologies 
instead.     includes large firms that lack advanced technologies.     includes large  
and technologically advanced firms.  The probabilities of being selected into each 
group are: 
(4)       Φ           1              0 ,     0          ,    ,  
(5)       Φ           2              0 ,     1          ,    ,    
(6)                 3            1 ,      0     Φ   ,    ,    
(7)               4              1 ,      1     Φ     ,    ,  , 
where Φ  is the cumulative density function for bivariate normal distribution. 
           ,            .  If the workers are randomly assigned to these four groups, 
the wage equation will be  
(8)                                           
(9)                                           
(10)                                       
(11)                                  , 
where        denotes the logarithm of worker i’s wage in group   1,2,3,4.    is a 
vector of explanatory variables which explain the worker’s wage.   ′  are vectors of 
unknown parameters associated with X.    ′  are random terms.  If common factors 
for both  ′  and  ′  exist, OLS estimation directly applied into these groups will lead 
to possible selection bias (Heckm , 197    an 9).
In our case, we assume  ′  and  ′  are multivariate normally distributed with 
mean zero and covariance matrix, 
(12)         ,    ,    ,    ,    ,       
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If    
   or    
  are not equal to zero, the expectation of random errors in (8) - (11) will 
not generally be zero, conditional on the fact that we only observe workers’ group. 
Namely,  
 13                            |      0 ,     0   
        
        ,     
 14                              |   ,     0 ,     1    
             15                              |  ,     1 ,     0    
 16                               |   ,      1 ,      1    
        Tunali (1986) shows that if the error terms are normally distributed with 
covariance matri ), v n it   ag u s turn out to be  x (12  the abo e co d ional w e eq ation
(17)                                             0 ,     0  
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                                          1 ,     0  
              
    
      
    
                1 ,       (20)        1 , 
where    ,    ,    ,         are random terms with mean zero because            
   
    
      
    
 ,   1,2,3,4.    ′  are the counterpart of inverse Mill’s ratio in a 
double selection fram k a e iv  T ewor nd d r ed in unali (1986) as: 
(21)  
        
            1          Φ     
             
            1          Φ     
   
       
            2          Φ    
       
          2          Φ     
   
       
          3          Φ     
       
            3          Φ    
   
  
          4      Φ    
       
          4          Φ    
   
, 
        
where    
   
            
            ,   
   
           _ 
           .       is the density function of a standard 
  7 
normal distribution, Φ   is the cumulative density function of a standard normal 
distribution.  Tunali shows that the parameters in wage equation could be consistently 
estimated by two stage regressions. Namely, in the first stage, a bivariate probit model 
of equation (2) and (3) describes worker’s choices based on the explanatory variables 
 ′ .  After the regression, the consistent estimator of   ′  are calculated and used to 
estimate wage equation (17) – (20) separately.  Because of the nonlinearity nature of 
probit model,  ′  are not necessarily needed to be different from  ′  for the 
identification concern, while in some cases, the identical variables used in both 
selection model and wage equation will cause severe multicollinearity problem in 
wage equation (Willis and Rosen, 1979). Therefore, we choose a different set of 
explanatory variables for selection and wage equations.  Discussion of choice and 
definition of variables are in the next section.  Tunali also points out the 
heteroscedastic nature of error terms in equation (17) – (20) and the least square 
standard errors of the coefficients are inconsistent essentially.    
III.  Data 
We use a unique cross sectional survey data from employees on U.S. hog 
farms in 1995, 2000, and 2005.  Questionnaires were mailed to the subscribers to the 
National Hog Farmer Magazine and we collected 2,266 useful surveys.  Hog industry 
has been consolidated in recent decades.  Small farms have been driven out of the 
market and the share of large farms has been increasing, which lead to the decline of 
the total number of farms.  So the number of observations in the sample is not evenly 
distributed across years. There are 1,149 observations in 1995, 617 in 2000 and 500 in 
2005.   
Each individual responded the question of how many pigs were produced per 
year defined by a categorical variable ranging from 1 to 10.  The smallest farm 
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produced fewer than 500 pigs annually and the largest farm may produce more than 
100,000 pigs.  We further define a binary variable Size, which is equal to one if a farm 
could produce more than 10,000 pigs, 0 otherwise.  Again, hog market consolidation 
makes the distribution of farm sizes shifted to the large farms in our sample.  46% of 
farms were large in 1995 while 74% were large in 2005.  
The data base also includes questions about if any of specific technologies was 
used in individual worker’s farm.  Hog production in the U.S. has experienced 
tremendous technological innovations in advances in genetics, nutrition, housing and 
handling equipment, veterinary and medical services, and management practices, and 
the technology adoption contributes to productivity gain in recent decades (McBride 
and Key, 2007).  The appendix shows the technologies used in the hog farms between 
1995 and 2005
2.  The number of technologies adopted by the farm represents the 
technology adoption intensity and can approximate the production complexity.  In the 
pork industry, large farms are found to favor technology adoption.  7.3 % of farms 
adopted at most one of the advanced technologies and 70% of them produced fewer 
than 5,000 pigs.  In contrast, 8.8% of farms adopted all of technologies and more than 
three quarters of them produced more than 25,000 pigs annually.  On average, 4.5 
technologies were used on a farm.  Similarly, Technology is defined as a binary 
variable, equal to one if more than five technologies were adopted, 0 otherwise.  
Hog farms are categorized into four types according to production scale (D1 in 
the notation in Section II) and technology adoption intensity (D2).  Hence, there are 
                                                             
2 Two new technologies, Auto Sorting (AS) and Parity Based Management (PBM) are new 
technologies and were only available in the survey in 2005.   Fewer than 30% of farms in 2005 adopted 
either of the two technologies. Because we control year fixed effect in our model and hog operators are 
exposed to the same technological shocks, different composition of technology across survey years will 
not significantly alter our results.  
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four combinations of farm types, (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0) and (1, 1),  as shown in Table 1
3.  
Farms of type (0, 0) are small and use no more than five technologies.  Farms of type 
(1, 1) are large and technologically intensive.  The dataset enables us to estimate 
treatment effects from size and technology adoption on wages after correcting 
nonrandom assignment of workers into different types of firms.  Finally, information 
about worker’s social economic characteristics, wage level, work environment 
evaluation and their health conditions is also available
4.  In particular, there are 
several measures of worker skills or human capital: worker’s formal education, 
previous working experience in the pork industry, tenure in the current farms and pork 
production related childhood background.  
Summary of statistics is shown in Table 1.  Log of wage is highest in farms of 
type (1, 1) and lowest in farms of type (0, 0).  The wage differential in the two types 
of farms is 0.47.  The other two types of farms also pay more than (0, 0) type of farms. 
Women are more likely to work in large farms but less likely to work in 
technologically intensive farms.  Workers in large and small farms are nearly equally 
educated on average but more educated workers are more likely to work with more 
advanced technologies.   There is a stronger complementarity of worker schooling 
with technology adoption than with farm size.  Current work experience is 
                                                             
3 Not all hog farms are farrow-to-finish ones.  Some, though a smaller proportion, of farms specialize in 
farrow-to-feeder or feeder-to-finish operations.  Farm size of feeder-to-finish operations is expected to 
be smaller than that of feeder-to-finish operations.  At the same time, technology adoption scenarios 
may also be different.  It may be expected that farms raising feeder pigs to the market tend to have 
fewer technology options than would farms that raise piglets to finish pigs. If selection process for this 
particular farm type is significantly different from general farrow-to-finish farms, estimation of 
earning’s function and size wage premium will be biased.  We replicated our analysis of model using a 
restricted sample that included only farrow-to-finish farms. We get qualitatively similar results and 
conclusions with those obtained with the full sample, and so our results are not driven by type of 
operations. 
4 Location of farms are categorized into four regions: mid-west: IA, IL, IN, MN, MO, ND, NE, OH, 
SD, WI; northeast: CT,DC, DE, MA, MD, ME, MI, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT; southeast: AL,FL, GA, 
KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV; and west: AK, AR, AZ, CA,CO, HI, ID, KS, MT, NM, NV, OK, 
OR, TX, UT, WA, WY. 
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significantly skewed to small firms but not necessarily to high technology type of 
farms.  In contrast, previous experience of working in the pork industry is positively 
related with both farm size and production complexity.  Farm raised individuals tend 
to work in small farms and they are possibly still working for family farms which are 
generally small.  
IV.  Findings  
We apply the methodology laid out in Section II to the sample of employees 
on the US hog operations from 1995 to 2005.  The formulation of earnings function 
taking into account of selection on farm size and technology complexity enables us to 
address two major concerns of the literature.  The first concern has to do with the 
importance of wage differentials in conditioning farm types.  As shown in the 
estimated standard earning’s function Table 2, even after controlling for worker’s 
characteristics, firm’s location and year fixed effect, dummy variables Size and 
Technology are significantly positively related with log of wage.  Both size wage 
premium and technology wage premium are significantly positive.  However, as noted 
above, potential endogeneity of Size and Technology may bias estimated coefficients 
for the whole sample and for subsample of farms with different types in particular.  
The second concern has to do with the treatment effect of the two important factors on 
realized wages.  After controlling for differential responses and characteristics, 
treatment effect or impact of both Size and Technology may not be positive.  In other 
words, if equivalent workers are randomly assigned to different types of farms, 
workers in large and technologically intensive farms may be paid less than their 
counterparts.  Whether selection is positive or negative will lead to different 
conclusions about labor supply and labor demand in the pork industry.  We present 
empirical findings regarding the implied wage premium and offer possible 
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explanations by citing several theories and presenting complementary evidence from 
the survey questions. Then we make wage differentials decomposition.  
A direct result from double selection: shrunk wage premium 
Bi-variate probit model of double selection on Size and Technology is 
presented in Table 3.  The results are not particularly surprising, consistent with 
general findings in the literature.  Workers with higher education, workers with 
previous relevant working experience and workers with hog-raising background are 
more likely to work on large farms and on technologically advanced farms.  The 
correlation coefficient is 0.57, indicating that unobserved attributes on farms and 
individuals significantly positively affect selection on farm size and technology 
adoption intensity.   
Based on this double selection regression above, inverse mills ratios for four 
types of farms are obtained using equation (21) and added to the earnings function.  
Estimation of equations (17) – (20) is shown in the last four columns of Table 2.  We 
find that earning’s functions are different across different types of hog farms.  And at 
least one of the coefficients of inverse mills ratios in each farm type is significantly 
different from zero.  The null hypothesis of no selection is rejected at the 5 percent 
level of significance, indicating the existence of unobservables common to both the 
selection and wage determination process.  Both farm size and technology complexity 
should be endogenously treated to remove the selection bias on wage premium 
estimation.  Because truncated mean of inverse mill’s ratios for farms with     0  or 
    0  are negative and positive for farms with     1  or     1 , negative selection 
coefficients for both four types of farms indicate that estimated wage premiums on 
farm size and technology adoption intensity are reduced, compared to the wage gap 
when workers are randomly allocated to four types of farms (Idson and Feaster, 1990).   
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Several possibilities are proposed to account for the shrunk wage premiums.  
Since our results are based on samples from pork production and technology adoption 
is prevalent in today’s agricultural production, specific theories pertaining to 
agricultural context are borrowed to justify the selection behaviors. However, we do 
not exclude other potential interpretations. 
Firstly, pork industry and generally agricultural industry are quite competitive and 
small farms which do not benefit from economy of scale tend to easily exit the market.  
Therefore, job stability and job security are worker’s big concerns.  Workers who are 
risk averse to job instability would like not to work in small farms. Large farms attract 
workers because of higher profit margin and their dominant positions in the 
competitive agricultural market.  However, agricultural production is consistent with 
the O-Ring theory where any mistake in a single stage from a series of production 
process may lead to catastrophic failure (Kremer, 1993; Yu et al, 2009).  Infection of 
one pig may spread the diseases to the entire heard, driving profits to be negative.  
Farms of larger scale are at greater stake and they are assumed to bear more risks.  
Therefore, disease control is critically important for hog production.  Large farms 
have greater incentives to adopt several advanced technologies to curb spread of 
diseases among pigs, such as Multiple Site Production, All-In-All-Out, Medicated 
Early Weaning and Parity Based Management.  From the perspective of hog workers, 
farms that are less technologically intensive ensure a lower level of job security.   
Secondly, workers in the agricultural industry are at increased risk for 
occupational injuries, illnesses and even death, and the pork industry is no exception.  
For example, hazardous gases released from decomposed manure and dust created 
primarily from feeding practices put workers at risk for respiratory illness. Hog 
farmers are found markedly tend to have higher risk in reduced hand strength and 
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respiratory symptoms than non farmers (Hurley, et al, 2000).  Workers, who are 
increasingly likely to be hired from varying backgrounds, have become more aware of 
existing occupational hazard than workers in the past.  Farms with improved working 
conditions, especially for air quality will attract workers who care about health 
conditions.  
 We find that workers from either large farms or farms using complex 
technologies reported a low level of dust and gas in the workplace and their 
employer’s provision of protection on ear, eye and feet.  As shown in Table 4, farms 
that are large or technologically advanced, or both have better environment than (0, 0) 
type of farms.  Dust and gas levels are lower in those farms.  At the same time, nearly 
all of them provide dust masks or respirators and ear protection to their workers. They 
are about 50% more likely to provide protection on ears, eyes and feet.   
However, it is noteworthy that as far as the consequences of employer supply of 
protection are concerned, not all of symptoms were reduced on large and 
technologically complex farms compared to the (0, 0) type of farms.  Workers in high 
type farms are less likely to have throat irritation, chest tightness or wheezing chest, 
but they do not have significantly reduced occurrences of other symptoms such as 
phlegm, loess of hand strength or back pain.  One of the reasons might be that 
workers do not always wear the masks or other protective devices even they are 
provided.  Because working environment is believed to be better than other farms, 
workers have reduced incentives in wearing protective devices.  Adverse selection 
problem occurs.  The other reason is that some symptoms are hard to be avoided even 
if some protective devices are provided, such as loss of hand strength and back pain.  
Last but not the least, the findings also shed light on the wage policies in the hog 
farms.  The existence of positive size premium even after selection by workers is 
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controlled can reflect wage policies by producers in multiple ways.  Because large 
farms using more technologies benefit from economy of scale, they would like to 
share the productivity gain with employees.  Alternatively, because the monitoring 
cost in the large firms tends to be higher than that in the small firms, large farms 
would rather set a wage premium as penalty for shirking, holding other characteristics 
constant.  Similarly, farms could use the agency models where workers care about 
their pecuniary utility.  It incurs monitoring cost to a less degree when evaluation of 
relative performance among workers is used.   However, large farms are cautious in 
using relative performance to design wage structures.  Highly skewed wage 
distribution may induce sabotage among workers (Lazear, 1989).  Again, because 
agricultural production is consistent with the O-Ring theory, cooperation and 
coordination among workers are increasingly important with farm size and production 
complexity.  Large farms tend to set average wages higher than those in small farms 
but reduce the wage gap among workers therefore reduce potential sabotage.  A 
similar note has been made by Idson and Feaster (1990).  Because large firms tend to 
have formal work environment and would more highly value workers who fit well 
into this environment, workers with “independence” and “individual drive” are less 
likely to offer themselves to such formal work environment.   
 At the same time, people usually prefer fairness to inequality (Agell, 2004).  
That is why pay is more compressed in large firms than in small firms. As shown in 
Table 1, variance of log of real salaries is smaller in large farms no matter to what 
extent advanced technologies are adopted.  And in a reverse way, variance of log of 
real salaries is smaller in technologically advanced farms no matter how many pigs 
can be produced on those farms.   
Decomposition of wage differentials 
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          In this subsection, we decompose wage differences between different types of 
farms such that we can detect where the differentials are from and by how much they 
are attributed to different factors.  Wage differentials are decomposed in a similar way 
of Idson and Feaster (1990) with a standard Oaxaca/Blinder method (Blinder 1973, 
Oaxaca 1973).  For the difference of expected logarithm wage in group j and group 1, 
  1 ,   the wage differential is decomposed into several parts according to the 
following equation, 
(22)                                  
′
0 . 5                         0.5         
′
                
     
   
        
   
          
   
          
   
       
The left hand side term of (22) is the raw logarithm wage differential (R).  The three 
terms in the right hand side are the endowment contribution to wage differential (E), 
the changing coefficients’ contribution to wage differential, which could be further 
decomposed into the part explained by the explanatory variables other than the 
constant intercepts in wage equation (C) and the part absorbed in the intercepts (U), 
and wage differential caused by self-selection (S).   
Table 5 shows bilateral wage differentials’ decompositions among four types 
of farms.  Wage differences mainly lie in individual’s selectivity, responding 
coefficients and intercepts.  Differences in worker endowments contribute to the 
smallest proportion of wage differentials.  Furthermore, selection on size and 
technology adoption intensity is not uniform.  Differentials from selectivity are all 
negative except for one case (S3 vs S2) and this is consistent with the selection effect 
of reducing wage premium.  
We find that the effect of reducing wage gap is comparably stronger for 
selection on technology complexity than for selection on farm size.  It can be seen 
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from Table 5 that the magnitude of wage differentials from selectivity is larger than 
for technology selection, holding farm size constant.  For example, more than 70% 
and 85% of the raw wage differences excluding selectivity for cases (S2 vs S1) and (S4 
vs S3) are due to selection respectively.  In contrast, no matter how many technologies 
farms adopted, i.e., holding technology complexity constant, selectivity bias from 
farm size is smaller. For example, only 44% and 79% of the raw wage differences 
excluding selectivity for cases (S3 vs S1) and (S4 vs S2) are due to selection 
respectively.   
Therefore, it again justifies that technology adoption intensity be endogenous 
in wage equation and extending the selection dimension be required to reduce the 
estimation bias.  As noted above, the majority of technologies used in the hog farms 
are used to prevent diseases that are extremely important to profits.  Furthermore, as 
shown in Table 4, workers in high technology farms rated a better work environment 
than those in large farms.  Workers self select themselves into high technology farms 
are more willing to compensate monetary income for working in a less hazardous 
workplace which has low job loss risks at the same time.   
Holding the number of technologies used on the farms constant, difference in 
corresponding coefficients is the major component for wage differentials between 
large and small farms ( case (S3 vs S1) and (S4 vs S2)).  Large farms set higher 
coefficients responding to worker’s characteristics and other firm attributes than small 
farms.  As stated above, large farms find it hard to monitor workers, setting bigger 
coefficients could serve to prevent worker shirking. At the same time, knowing this, 
potential workers are attracted to large size farms.  
           We also calculate some conditional wage gaps across different groups, which 
could help us understand the potential wage benefit a worker could have by switching 
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to different type of farms.  The conditional wage gap for a worker who are observed 
in the group j is the wage difference between the expected wage he has obtained in 
group j and the expect wage he would have if he were selected into group k, where 
     ,  ,    1,2,3        4.  Explicitly, 
(23)    Δ ,           1             |    1 ,  ≡        1                
                     
   
      
   
      
   
      
   
    
Table 6 shows the conditional wages for workers in (0, 0) farms and (1, 1) 
type of farms in the upper and lower panel respectively.  Because of existence of 
dummy independent variables, worker characteristics are specified and evaluated at 
some values or status such that conditional wages can be calculated.  As shown in the 
upper panel, a male worker in a typical type (0, 0) farm which was located in the west 
received wage 5.08 in 2005.  If he was employed in (0, 1) type of farms, his total 
income will be 6.22, which comes from an increase in return to change in observables 
Xβ, 1.36, and a decrease due to selection, 0.22.  Both male and female employees in 
farm of (0, 0) type experience wage increase from Xβ and wage decrease from 
selection.  The lower panel of Table 6 shows the wage decrease experienced by 
female and male employees on farms of (1, 1) type if switching to other types of 
farms.  Again, wage drop is mainly due to change in Xβ. Selection difference is very 
small.  However, results from both panels indicate the same conclusion that selection 
on technologies is bigger in magnitude than selection on farm size in explaining wage 
differentials
5.  
V.  Conclusion and discussion 
Size wage premium is voluminously documented in literature.  However, the 
                                                             
5 In the upper panel, selection differentials due to switch from S1 to S2 and S4 are bigger in absolute 
value than those due to switch from S1 to S3. In the lower panel, selection differentials due to switch 
from S4 to S1 and S3 are bigger in absolute value than those due to switch from S4 to S2.  
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current studies neglect the strong complementarity between firm size and technology 
adoption, which has been found to have significant treatment effects on wages.    This 
study contributes to the literature by providing a better understanding of size wage 
premium, labor supply decisions and wage policies.  We include both size and 
technology adoption in a double selection framework.  We then apply the method to 
estimate the wage structure in the US hog farms. It is found that correction for 
selection on both size and technology adoption is required in wage equation and wage 
premium for large farms or for technologically advanced farms are reduced after this 
double selection is added into the earning’s function.   Workers would rather 
compensate pecuniary wages for better work environment and more secure job 
stability, which is particularly highlighted in the agricultural industry.  The effect of 
reducing wage gap is comparably stronger for selection on technology complexity 
than for selection on farm size. 
Technology adoption has been paid a lot of attention to in agricultural 
production because it can boost productivity and reduce cost.  From this study we find 
that worker’s belief on job stability and job itself induces them to self-select into 
technologically advanced farms.   Agricultural production has been experiencing rapid 
technological innovation and farms become more and more specialized, which 
motives a future research direction: whether wage premium is stable over time.   This 
study uses a cross sectional data base which provides a channel to the future research 
once a panel is available.   
A limitation of the study is that because respondents of surveys are subscribers 
to the Magazine, they are not very representatives of all hog farm employees.  And 
because the propensity to respond to surveys may be larger for employees in larger 
farms and lower for smaller farms, the sample under represents the small hog farms.  
  19 
Therefore, this study is an attempt to better understand the wage structure in hog 
production based on a snapshot of hog farms.  Availability of a new data base will 
facilitate the consistent estimation of size and technology treatment effects on wages 
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lnw  Natural log of real salary  5.33  ( .49)  5.65 (.45)  5.61 ( .37)  5.80 (.34)  5.57 (.46) 
Female  Gender, equal to 1 if the worker is a female  0.08  ( .28)  0.07 (.26)  0.12 (.32)  0.10 (.31)  0.10 (.30) 
Education  Years of schooling  13.80 (2.54)  15.19 (2.96)  13.78 (2.23)  14.60 (2.27)  14.10 (2.44) 
Tenure  Working experience in the current farm  8.68  (8.00)  7.72 (7.15)  5.73 (5.79)  6.08 (6.24)  6.96 (6.94) 
Prev Exp  1 if previously working in a hog farm, 0 otherwise  0.42 ( .49)  0.56 (.50)  0.56 (.50)  0.62 (.49)  0.53 (.50) 
Raised  1 if raised in a hog farm, 0 otherwise  0.55  ( .50)  0.57 (.50)  0.44 (.50)  0.49 (.50)  0.50 (.50) 
Northeast  1 if located in the northeast, 0 otherwise  0.07  ( .25)  0.04 (.20)  0.05 (.23)  0.04 (.19)  0.05 (.23) 
Southeast  1 if located in the southeast, 0 otherwise  0.08  ( .27)  0.14 (.35)  0.14 (.34)  0.16 (.37)  0.12 (.33) 
West  1 if located in the west, 0 otherwise  0.08  (.28)  0.06 (.23)  0.18 (.38)  0.13 (.34)  0.13 (.33) 
2000  1 if survey was responded in 2000, 0 otherwise  0.17  ( .37)  0.26 (.44)  0.38 (.49)  0.28 (.45)  0.27 (.45) 
2005  1 if survey was responded in 2005, 0 otherwise  0.13  ( .34)  0.22 (.41)  0.24 (.43)  0.31 (.46)  0.22 (.41) 
Sized  Dummy, definition in the note  0  0  1  1  0.60 (.49) 
Technology  Dummy, definition in the note  0  1  0  1  0.34 (.47) 
λ1  Inverse Mill’s Ration on Size  -0.73(.29) -1.54(0.43) 0.78(0.29) 0.34(0.19) 0.00(0.79) 
λ2  Inverse Mill’s Ration on Technology -0.30(.12)  1.62(0.29)  -0.77(0.21)  0.88(0.20)  0.00(0.79) 
Obs  Number of observations  776  139  720  631  2266 
Note: The number  in the parenthesis is standard deviation.  The education level in the survey is categorical. We define continuous variable Edyears  as schooling years (SY) of a worker in 
the following way. SY = 9 if she is a high school dropout.  SY = 12 if she is a high school graduate.  SY = 14 if she attended the four year college but did not complete or had other 
equivalent diploma, such as completing vocational technical /school program or junior college program. SY = 16 if she is has a bachelor’s degree.  SY = 19 if she has master degree. SY = 
23 if she is a Ph.D. degree holder or a Doctor of Veterinary Medicine. Salaries are discrete categories in the survey.  We define the salary as a continuous variable by taking the mid-point of 
the range for each category, adjusted by the consumer price index from the Labor Statistics Bureau (CPI in 1995, 2000 and 2005 is 91.2177,  98.8768 , 110.4758 respectively).  lnW is the 
natural log of the real salary. Size is defined as a dummy variable, equal to one if farms produce greater than or equal to 10,000 pigs each year, otherwise zero if farms produce fewer than 
10,000 pigs. Technology is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if 6 or more technologies were used, 0 otherwise.  Inverse Mill’s Ratios are used in Table 2, 5 and 6. 
  23  
Table 2 Earning’s function 
Variable  OLS 
   Farm type (D1, D2) 
   (0,0)  (0,1)  (1,0)  (1,1) 
Constant  4.846     5.7215  9.0946  6.0648  8.1742 
   (0.1695)





Female  -0.2103     -0.2207  -0.2833  -0.1453  -0.2282 
  (0.0277)





Education  0.0144     -0.1894  -0.415  -0.1362  -0.2394 







0.0011     0.0085  0.0132  0.0047  0.008 





Tenure  0.0135     0.0126  -0.023  0.0173  0.0271 
  (0.0028)
***     (0.0056)





-0.0003     -0.0003  0.0014  -0.0003  -0.0005 
  (0.0001)





2000  0.075     -0.3177  -0.2782  0.047  -0.033 
  (0.0201)
***     (0.1066)
***  (0.2264)  (0.0741)  (0.0633) 
2005  0.016     -0.5218  -0.3246  -0.1453  -0.2119 
  (0.0224)     (0.1006)
***  (0.2113)  (0.0715)
**  (0.0627)
*** 
Northeast  0.0117     0.1285  -0.0661  0.0427  0.1493 
  (0.0369)     (0.0750)
*  (0.1985)  (0.0614)  (0.0672)
** 
West  -0.0399     -0.39  -0.2127  -0.1197  -0.0358 
  (0.0257)     (0.0774)
***  (0.1444)  (0.0466)
**  (0.0428) 
Southeast  0.0741     -0.2904  -0.1059  0.0924  0.1497 
   (0.0258)
***     (0.1381)
**  (0.3393)  (0.0871)  (0.0723)
** 
Size  0.2651                
   (0.0191)
***                
Technology  0.1832                
   (0.0188)
***                
λ1        -0.8694  -0.5849  -0.2054  -0.3598 
         (0.1831)
***  (0.2819)
**  (0.1321)  (0.1904)
* 
λ2         -0.1564  -0.6034  -0.8041  -0.6176 
         (0.4714)  (0.4497)  (0.1908)
***  (0.1677)
*** 
Observations  2266     776  139  720  631 
R-squared  0.27     0.138  0.237  0.213  0.242 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.   
           *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Table 3 Probit model of farm size and bivariate model of farm size and 
technology adoption intensity 
      Biprobit 
      Size  Technology 
Constant     -3.2244  -3.762 
      (0.5672)
***  (0.6079)
*** 
Female     0.0933  -0.0692 
     (0.0949)  (0.0938) 
Education     0.4097  0.3311 





   -0.0141  -0.008 
     (0.0025)
***  (0.0026)
*** 
Raise     -0.1578  0.0275 
     (0.0576)
***  (0.0575) 
Prev Exp
 
   0.3375  0.2856 
     (0.0562)
***  (0.0566)
*** 
2000     0.6736  0.1281 
     (0.0666)
***  (0.0662)
* 
2005     0.8302  0.4183 
     (0.0745)
***  (0.0712)
*** 
Northeast     -0.139  -0.2198 
     (0.1239)  (0.1326)
* 
West     0.4074  0.2256 
     (0.0892)
***  (0.0860)
*** 
Southeast     0.6027  -0.0677 
     (0.0906)
***  (0.0877) 
ρ     0.5709 
      (0.0409)*** 





Table 4 Survey on work environment and health of employees by farm type, 2000 
 
 Farm type 
(0,0)  (0,1)  (1,0)  (1,1) 
Working environment   
Rating of working environment 
            (1 excellent to 4 poor) 
2.15  1.82  1.93  1.79 
Rating of dust levels 
            (1 High, 2 Medium, 3 Low) 
2.09  2.23  2.05  2.21 
Rating of gas levels 
            (1 High, 2 Medium, 3 Low) 
2.48  2.60  2.44  2.53 
Employer’s supply of protection ( 1 Yes; 0 No) 
Dust masks or respirators   66.12%  86.96%  88.25%  94.94% 
Ear protection  55.84%  72.92%  83.53%  93.88% 
Eye protection   44.87%  55.10%  57.14%  68.82% 
Footwear & protection   37.18%  58.33%  63.64%  60.15% 
Lock-out or tag-out protection   32.89%  32.65%  43.53%  54.51% 
Experience of Symptoms ( 1 Yes; 0 No) 
Dry cough  31.00%  33.80%  36.52%  31.48% 
Throat irritation  33.33%  38.89%  33.03%  24.84% 
Chest tightness  21.88%  12.31%  25.00%  20.52% 
Wheezing chest  17.02%  18.46%  24.07%  13.58% 
Cough with phlegm  34.95%  31.88%  37.93%  34.80% 
Sinus problems  47.75%  50.00%  47.79%  44.44% 
Loss of hand strength  20.00%  23.44%  23.64%  21.38% 
Hands tingle or fall asleep  27.00%  26.87%  28.32%  30.03% 





Table 5 Decomposition of wage differentials  
Comparison  Endowment(E)     Coefficient(C)     Selectivity(S) 
S2 vs S1  -0.0453     -2.2546     -0.7567 
S3 vs S1  -0.1292     0.2874     -0.2211 
S4 vs S1  -0.1350     -0.4997     -1.3451 
S3 vs S2  -0.0605     2.5186     0.5356 
S4 vs S2  -0.0876     1.7529     -0.5884 
S4 vs S3  -0.0194     -0.7733     -1.1239 
   Intercept(U)     Raw(R)     Raw net of 
 Selectivity(N = R-S) 
S2 vs S1  3.3731     0.3165     1.0732 
S3 vs S1  0.3433     0.2803     0.5014 
S4 vs S1  2.4527     0.4730     1.8181 
S3 vs S2  -3.0298     -0.0362     -0.5718 
S4 vs S2  -0.9204     0.1565     0.7449 
S4 vs S3  2.1094     0.1927     1.3167 










S2 vs S1     -0.0422  -2.1008  -0.7051  3.1430 
S3 vs S1     -0.2577  0.5731  -0.4410  0.6846 
S4 vs S1     -0.0742  -0.2748  -0.7398  1.3491 
S3 vs S2     0.1059  -4.4047  -0.9367  5.2988 
S4 vs S2     -0.1176  2.3533  -0.7899  -1.2357 
S4 vs S3     -0.0148  -0.5873  -0.8536  1.6021 






 Table 6 Conditional wage gap for typical western workers in 2005 
   S1: (Small Size, Low Tech) 
   Male     Female 
S1: (Small Size, Low Tech)  5.08    4.96 
Δ in     1.36    1.24 
 Δ in selection  -0.22    -0.27 
S2: (Small Size, High Tech)  6.22    5.93 
Δ in     1.06    1.08 
 Δ in selection  -0.65    -0.74 
S3: (Large Size, Low Tech)  5.49    5.29 
Δ in     2.45     2.37 
 Δ in selection  -0.51     -0.58 
S4: (Large Size, High Tech)  7.02     6.74 
           
   S4: (Large Size, High Tech) 
   Male     Female 
S4: (Large Size, High Tech)  5.75    5.53 
Δ in     -2.36     -2.35 
 Δ in selection  0.27     0.31 
S1: (Small Size, Low Tech)  3.66    3.50 
Δ in     -1.05     -1.16 
 Δ in selection  -0.02     -0.02 
S2: (Small Size, High Tech)  4.67    4.36 
Δ in     -1.37    -1.29 
 Δ in selection  -0.12    -0.13 
S3: (Large Size, Low Tech)  4.27    4.10 
Note: Δ represent “change”.   workers are defined with observable attributes/variables. 
Specifically, for a male worker,edyears=14.9,      edsq=222.0, 
ycurjob=6.4,ycurjobsq=40.96. For a female worker, edyears=14.5, edsq=210.3, 
ycurjob=5.5, ycurjobsq=30.25.They represent typical hog workers of survey year 2005 in 
western states.  








Table A1 Description of technologies in the hog production 
 
Notation  Technology  Description 
AI   Artificial 
Insemination 
It focuses on enhancing hog reproductive efficiency and 
improving the gene pools. 
 
SSF  Split Sex Feeding  It feeds different rations to males and females. They have 
different diets for pigs of various weights and separate 
diets for gilts and barrows for maximum efficiency and 
carcass quality.  
 
PF  Phase Feeding  It involves feeding several diets for a relatively short 
period of time to more accurately and economically meet 
the pig's nutrient requirements.  
 
MSP  Multiple Site 
Production 
It produces hogs in separate places in order to curb disease 
spread.  
 
SEW  Segregated Early 
Weaning 
The method gives the piglets a better chance of remaining 
disease-free when separated from their mother at about 
three weeks when levels of natural antibodies from the 
sow's milk are reduced. And at the same time, early 
weaning helps to produce more piglets each year.  
 
MMEW  Medicated Early 
Weaning 
Its effect is same as MEW but less all-embracing. The 
range of infectious pathogens to be eliminated is not quite 
so comprehensive. MMEW can also be used to move pigs 
from a diseased herd to a healthy herd.  
 
MEW  Modified Medicated 
Early Weaning 
The method uses medication of the sow and piglets to 
produce excellent results in removing most bacterial 
infections.  
AIAO  All in / All out  It allows hog producers to tailor feed mixes to the age of 
their pigs (instead of offering either one mix to all ages or 
having to offer several different feed mixes at one time). It 
also helps limit the spread of infections to new arrivals by 
allowing for cleanup of the facility between groups of hogs 
being raised.  
 
AS  Auto Sorting 
Systems 
It helps in the way of labor savings, easier feed 
withdrawal, reductions in sort variation and sort loss, 
greater uniformity in pig market weight, and therefore 
more accurate marketing. 
 
PBM  Parity Based 
Management 
The specialization of labor in breeding, feeding and caring 
for pigs will benefit the production by reducing disease 
transmission and lowering the risk of new disease 
introductions. 
Note: Information is based on the USDA animal and plant health inspection service and 
ERS; http://www.thepigsite.com/; and National Hog Farmer http://nationalhogfarmer.com/.  
 